12/19/98

Tim Simpson

THE THERAPY OF UNLEARNING

AND ETHICS

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein is concerned with elucidating the logical form. But the logical form cannot be spoken of, only shown. Similarly, in the Investigations, he is in search of "complete clarity", but not in logic per se, but language or grammar. In this case, he is in search of the limits of language. As Phillip Shields, in Logic and Sin points out, however, logic and language are not Wittgenstein's deepest preoccupations. Rather, ethics and religion played a profound role in his life and philosophy. Because Wittgenstein focuses on logic and language, yet, was deeply preoccupied with ethics, as stated in reference to the Tractatus that its purpose was an ethical one, he draws a unique relationship between logic and language and ethics. In this paper, I will concentrate on the relationship between language and ethics. More specifically, I want to focus attention on this relationship from the pedagogical style Wittgenstein uses in writing the Philosophical Investigations. Burbules and Peters make clear that Wittgenstein's style of writing--asking questions, conceiving an interlocutor, and so forth--is pedagogical and of central importance to understanding him as a philosophical pedagogue. But then we may ask, What are we learning from the Investigations? What is he trying to teach us about language and ethics? This paper will claim that his teaching is a type of therapy which teaches us to unlearn a certain picture of language, which regulates to some degree, the kind of life in which we live. As a result, we learn to come to clarity in our language, in our forms of life and, so are ethical.

I will proceed by first showing that Wittgenstein's style is pedagogical in the Investigations. Then, I will show that, among other things, he is teaching us to unlearn language, or a type of thinking. Next, I will draw out how language is connected to actions of the individual and to Forms of Life. At that point, I can attempt to make clear the claim that Wittgenstein is trying, through shifting our thinking, to teach us how to be ethical.

As Burbules and Peters make clear, "the question of style [for Wittgenstein] is a question inseparable from the reality of his life and the corpus of his work." Wittgenstein's style of "doing" philosophy is pedagogical. Throughout the Investigations he "provides a teaming variety of vital repertoire of non-argumentional discursive forms--pictures, drawings, analogies, similes, jokes, equations, dialogues with himself, little narratives, questions and wrong answers, thought experiments, gnomic aphorisms and so on ... "

Wittgenstein's style has also been characterized as a therapy by authors such as Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 17-18, and James Peterman, Philosophy as Therapy, p. xiii. Hadot writes,

"[The Investigations] is a therapeutics that

is offered to us. Philosophy is an illness

of language ... The True Philosophy will

therefore consist in curing itself of phil-

osophy, in making every philosophical

problem completely and definitively dis-

appear ... the work (PI) cannot be the

exposition of a system, a doctrine, a

philosophy in the traditional sense ...

[PI] wishes to act little by little on

our spirit, like a cure, like a medical

treatment. (p. 17-18)

This type of reading resonates with Wittgenstein's own terminology. At Investigations (hereafter "PI") #133, he says, "There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies." (cf. disease #593, illness #255, and philosophical treatment #254) {{Although the therapeutic metaphor is attractive, I will not focus on it specifically, but will use it when appropriate}}

What is helpful about the relationship between Wittgenstein's pedagogical style and therapy is that it provides a focus to the main object of the PI, namely language. That is to say, if Wittgenstein's style is pedagogical, and his object of focus is language, then, he is trying to teach us something about our language.

Wittgenstein begins the PI with a picture of how language is learned according to St. Augustine. This is a primitive language-game. Here we see that ostensive definitions or "ostensive teaching of words", gives a name to an object. But an ostensive definition itself doesn't establish a connection between a word and a meaning. The connection is established not in the definition itself but "in the given form of life--the network of pre-existing conditions--that govern its employment (p. 83, Shields). At PI #19, he says, "And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."

Augustine's primitive language-game, however, is but a precursor to a more deeply disturbing language game, that of traditional philosophy. Traditional philosophy has given rise to and sustained misleading words, such as "soul" or the color "red", which give rise to our illness. For instance, since Descartes there has been a notion of a self, the "Cogito", which is said to be an immaterial substance, our essential self. We associate the word "self" with a mental image. But for Wittgenstein it is questionable whether two people have access to the term soul. Thus, it is a question whether they have the same understanding. Think also of the color "red". Is your mental image of red the same as my image of red? The uncertainty associated with mental images means that they themselves do not establish meaning. They obscure our view of the "logical grammar which actually sustains the meaning of our words" (p. 85, Shields).

Logical form or logical grammar provides the possibility for us to use words (i.e. language). In using words we make utterances and volley forth our words. In Culture and Value 74e, Wittgenstein says, "In a conversation: One person throws a ball; the other does not know: whether he is supposed to throw it back, or throw it to a third person, or leave it on the ground, or pick it up and put it in his pocket." By throwing the ball, we have acted in life. The one acting by using words looks to the actions of the one spoken to determine if he/she is understood. That is, we don't have access to the mental images "in our head" but rather we have access to one's actions and responses to our use of words. In this case, it does no good to talk of the "soul." We cannot be certain that we are communicating. Instead, we should look to the body. As Wittgenstein says at PI Part II, iv: "The human body is the best picture of the soul."

Through Wittgenstein's own pedagogical style he is trying to teach us how to unlearn a particular picture or model of language. "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside of it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably" (PI #115). His aphorisms, examples, and such attempt to capture the "inbetweeness" between two pictures, that between the soul as mental image and soul seen in the body's actions. This aporetic moment acts as the beginning of the remedy to solve the bewitchment of our language. We can think of Augustine's language game as a medicine to alleviate the bad picture. By shifting the picture he is shifting our language. And, to shift our language is to shift our form of life. He has leveled an indictment against the "philosophers" mode of living.

Because there are a multiplicity of language games which means there are a multiplicity of forms of life. To change from one language-game or form of life to another one needs to change how they use language. That is, we have to act different from the previous language-game to show new bounds which accompany this other mode of living as compared with the former mode. What we see in the shift between pictures is that language itself is action.

But to change modes of living is no easy task considering language itself is seductive. We are tempted by our language to believe that: "the surface grammar hides the underlying depth grammar.... Wittgenstein endeavors to clarify the elusive inner workings of language 'in despite of an urge to misunderstand them'" (p.5, Shields). Likewise, he says, "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." To win this battle, "what has to be overcome is a difficulty having to do with the will, rather than the intellect" (Culture and Value, p. 17e).

The will, then, is that which orients our gaze to see the better picture;use the correct usage of language. One might say, though, "But the 'will' is surely a mental image just as the word 'soul'." This type of question is not a problem for Wittgenstein. Again, he suggests that we look to the body, we look to our body's actions to evaluate whether we are correctly using language. Because when we use our language correctly then our actions are in agreement with that form of life. (This will be developed more fully later.) Our actions, in this case, are appropriate to that form of life. The mode of life in accord with complete clarity is a better mode of life than the philosopher.

The traditional philosopher shows a weakness of will by not demanding "complete clarity" of language. The actions of the philosopher are suspect. The philosopher does not allow for clear communication. The actions of the philosopher show that he/she keeps the philosophical disease.

For Wittgenstein to say that one mode of life is better than another is to say certain actions, here linguistic actions, are better than others. If his pedagogical style is teaching us to unlearn a certain picture of language, then he is also teaching us to both unlearn certain actions and take up new ones. Wittgenstein's focus on language, then, is far reaching in its affect on us.

"Working in philosophy--like work in

architecture in many respects--is real-

ly more a working on oneself. On one's

own interpretation. On one's way of see-

ing things. (And what one expects of

them.)" (Culture and Value, 16e)

At this point, it is important to disentangle this distinction between body and soul. We see above that the actions of the will play a role in the mode of life one lives. In fact, we look to the body's actions to determine which language-game or form of life one is acting in. But why don't we look instead to the intentions of the will of the person acting? Aren't those intentions the determining factor in the will's actions?

Again, Wittgenstein did not believe we had recourse to talk of the will, similar to the soul. Peter Winch astutely observes in his essay, Eine Einstellung zur Seele, this idea in relation to Wittgenstein's claim that "His attitude is a proof of his attitude." For Winch, "[Belief in something beyond the outward expression of pain] would quite misleadingly imply that we have a secure paradigm of what it is to believe something which does not draw its sustenance from the expressive behaviors in which it is embedded" (p. 142, Trying to Make Sense). One's attitude that he is in pain is shown in the actions towards that one in pain. Similarly, we cannot draw on the will, as an immaterial substance, to provide clear communication. The will shows itself through the body's actions. We look to the actions of the body in order to know the will because they are the only aspect we have access to.

The claim that the body's actions show the will provides a different way to look at how we know the will (or soul). We come to know the will not by claiming that we see "it" but through paying attention to the actions of another. However, one acts differently at many times. We act in a different way at a basketball game as opposed to a wake. Which one of our many actions do we look to as defining us? For Wittgenstein, we need not look to one action, but to the "family resemblances" of actions. At PI #67, he says something analogous in reference to a piece of thread, "And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres." There are a collection of actions we look to to ascribe the other person a disposition.

Take for instance a friend that you have had for years. This type of friendship allows you to be an active part in another person's life. You gain a great insight into the person by observing many actions of that individual. We may call this picture of the individual their disposition. (Wittgenstein, many close friends said, had a serious disposition.) The disposition ascribed to an individual is not precise, rigid or acts in a limiting way. That is, ascribing someone a disposition does not pigeon-hole that person with a label, as for instance "Conservative Republican" might. Rather, as Wittgenstein says in the PI, we only need a "rough" picture. So, a disposition gives us a rough picture of the individual.

However, the picture we present of ourselves is of great importance. For it is our actions which present a picture to the world. What is more, we judge one's actions to determine character. In three places in Culture and Value he suggests that character is related to action. Here is one example at 65e, "Genius is talent in which character makes itself heard." (emphasis added) (cf. 35e, 54e) Character is a certain quality of our actions in which we have access to.

What is more, actions show an individuals moral character. But as the Tractatus suggests ethics cannot be spoken of, only shown.

6.42 So too it is impossible for there

to be propositions of ethics.

6.423 It is impossible to speak about the

will in so far as it is the subject

of ethical attributes.

So, too, an individuals moral character can only be shown. This places great importance on language for it is the action most accessible of all the actions of the body is linguistic.

But suppose someone where to ask, "Is she ethical (pointing to a particular woman)?" Wittgenstein would likely respond, "Look! Look to her actions." At this point, the question arises, "What is it about her actions that make her ethical? What is she doing to be ethical?"

Following James Peterman in Philosophy as Therapy, "to be ethical is to be in agreement with a form of life." In a weak sense, to be in agreement with one's form of life "is to avoid puzzlement and the related rejection of the familiar aspects of language and our life as deficient relative to some hidden ideal." (p.108, Peterman). In a stronger sense, it "is to fail to have a representation of the phenomenon providing one a synoptic grasp that allows one to have a feel for the phenomenon" (ibid., Peterman). In a more positive sense, to be in agreement with a form of life is to act appropriate to each form of life. Our actions show that we understand the form of life we are in.

In the more positive sense of being in agreement with a form of life it would be fruitful to explore Nel Nodding's notion of care (Caring, 1984). In her notion of caring there seems to be the idea of receptivity. That is, we enter into a form of life paying great attention to the other persons actions. We recognize that the context of the situation regulates what the appropriate response may be. It would be an inappropriate response to laugh hysterically at a priest giving a homily on sunday morning mass. Likewise, it would be inappropriate as a crisis hotline counselor to shout expletives to a caller considering suicide. Both of these cases demand a seriousness. But a seriousness is not out of line with the notion of caring. Being present in the moment with a another requires a certain disposition or character that shows its seriousness. The seriousness is a sign of caring for the relationship; a desire to both understand and be understood. In this instance, to care is to respect the situation and interlocutor involved in the relationship. In fact, approaching the relationship in a caring manner changes the relationship itself.

The disposition towards each form of life, the disposition to care in each situation, does not mean that the same type of caring is evident in each form of life. What makes life difficult is that many forms of life require a different type of caring; one that is context specific. As Lawrence Blum notes, "[that] caring can be different in different contexts actually gives a morality of care a greater power and scope..." But at the same time, we must be acutely aware of the context and appropriateness of our actions, so as to act appropriately.

Why the demand for such attentiveness to the interlocutor and awareness of the appropriate response? Because, again, the only thing we have access to is the actions between us and the interlocutor. We are striving for clear communication. In order to come as close as possible to clear communication we want to have clarity in our actions. To do this we must be completely aware of the situation.

If we are acting in agreement with a particular form of life, then our linguistic actions, our using of words, must be in agreement as well. This claim has the related claim that to be in agreement in a form of life via language, means to be in agreement with the language-game. This would mean that we use language in the appropriate way. Our attentiveness or deep respect for the language-game enables us to achieve clarity in our own language, as well as trying to communicate our ideas.

We strive for clarity in our language to come to philosophical peace. At that point, the fog caused by our language disappears and we see clearly. One may argue that Wittgenstein's notion of philosophy as therapy has found its endpoint in producing philosophical peace. Peace arises when one finds agreement in the forms of life which are not puzzled by language. At PI #133, he states, "For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear .... The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to." It is at just this moment, when two individuals can achieve complete clarity because the philosophical problems are non-existent, that the possibility of clear communication is at its height. And one can only achieve this state by coming to complete clarity oneself and caring for the other individual in order to be present to the moment. {It could be argued here that being so in tune with the appropriate needs of the interlocutor is what is deeply religious about Wittgenstein. I would also submit that in this respect Wittgenstein's philosophy is deeply influenced by Leo Tolstoy.}

But notice again that to be acting in agreement with each form of life is to be acting in agreement via language. Language, as I have suggested, is the most accessible action of the body. And this is the reason for striving form complete clarity in language. Moreover, it is vitally important to being ethical.

Now, let us return to Wittgenstein's pedagogical style or therapy. It makes sense that Wittgenstein used the pedagogical style because he was trying to shift our thinking. His style shos he is trying to shift our thinking. He first had to uproot a particular picture of language and the mode of life which accompanied it. To do so, he had to provide an alternative picture albeit indirectly so that an aporetic moment was meant to free us, release us from the picture that held us captive. If we were able to sustain the new picture, habituate ourselves to it, then we increased the chances for gaining complete clarity. Wittgenstein's therapy is an unlearning of a particular language-game and form of life intended to produce a new mode of living, one that is ethical.

An understanding of complete clarity as I have presented in this paper further spells out Wittgenstein's dissatisfaction with Socrates. For Socrates, would often dawn a "mask", i.e. be slightly deceptive about what he really knows, in order to engage the interlocutor. (cf. Hadot) But, according to Wittgenstein, this is unjust. It is unjust because it does not allow for complete clarity and one is not acting true to the situation at hand. However, I would claim that there are many instances where it is Socrates' attentiveness and respect for the relationship which is the only valuable learning tool in the dialogue, e.g. the Meno. The Platonic dialogue is the closest approximation to a real encounter.

Gail Presbey, Ways in which Oral Philosophy is Superior to Written Philosophy (APA Newsletter, 96:1), shows how African philosophy has had a long oral tradition rather than a written tradition. In this tradition, the philosophers presence in their relationship is crucial to understanding the philosopher as well as feeling the impact of his/her speaking. The commanding presence of the African oral tradition is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's own presence in the classroom. I would submit that the Philosophical Investigations is the closest approximation of his own speaking. His pedagogical style of writing shows his doing philosophy. Style in this way is not a technical accomplishment. As Peters and Marshall note, in the same way that the "human body is the best picture of the soul" (PI, part II, iv), so a "man's style is a picture of him" (Culture and Value, 79e).

It is in his style that he is trying to be ethical. He provides a teaming variety of examples, pictures, aphorisms, etc. to touch on many different language-games in hope of finding the one that responds to the reader. He himself is searching to find the language-game, form of life, which will to usurp the picture which produces philosophical illness. He, too, is in search of complete clarity; clarity that allows him to be in agreement with many forms of life. So, we have a sense of his own ethical preoccupation.

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Dear Reader, If this draft seems disjointed, fuzzy, or such, it is only because it may very well be. The project that I have set before myself is one that cannot be adequately addressed with my limited understanding of Wittgenstein. This project requires a deep understanding of the man and his philosophy. In any case, the paper presented here acts to speak to the relationships between language, ethics, and Wittgenstein's pedagogical style. In that, I have done my best. More importantly, this draft could not have been conceived or brought to light without the many discussions with Charlotte Frye and Tim McDonough. To them I owe a great deal of thanks.