Wittgenstein is one of the greatest philosophers in the 20^th century. The main reason why he has a great influence on philosophy is that he comes up with a revolutionary aspect to philosophy. Traditional philosophy studies some fundamental questions about universe and human lives, such as "What is the original source in the universe?", "What is truth, goodness, and beauty?", "What is the meaning of life?" Different thinkers propose different answers, and the answers will become their philosophy. If we ask that what is Wittgenstein’s philosophy? This is a really hard question. Because he does not give answers to traditional philosophy questions, rather than proposes questions over these questions twice, the early Wittgenstein and the late Wittgenstein. He often tells his students that he never "solves" philosophy questions, but "dissolves" philosophy questions. Strictly speaking, Wittgenstein has "the viewpoint of philosophy" on the traditional philosophy. That is to say, he raises his viewpoints to what is the essence, the purpose, and the method in philosophy.

In this paper, firstly, we will discuss the early Wittgenstein’s "philosophy" in section 1. In section 2, the reasons of transition between the early Wittgenstein and the late Wittgenstein will be discussed. The late Wittgenstein’s "philosophy" will be discussed in section 3, 4 and 5. And the evaluation of Wittgenstein will be discussed in section 6.

As claimed by Wittgenstein himself clearly in the preface, the main purpose of his early work, Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1922), is to " [deal] with the problems of philosophy and [show], as I believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language" (Wittgenstein, 1922. P.27). In other words, Wittgenstein believed that if we understand the logic of language properly, philosophical problems should not be raised. Accordingly, the main purpose and method of the book, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, is to finish and end the philosophical thinking.

In order to attain this goal–to end the philosophical thinking, Wittgenstein proposed to put a limit on the notion of "thinking", i.e., he proposed to distinguish what "thinkable is from what "unthinkable" is. The proposal of Wittgenstein is similar to that of Kant when he dealt with the notion of knowledge in Critique of Pure Reason.(Kant, 1965). Nevertheless, the difference (between the former and the latter) is that Wittgenstein turned the attention from "thinking" to "the expression of thinking", i.e., language. Wittgenstein claimed that only language can play the role of drawing the line between "thinkable" and "unthinkable". Therefore, the main intention of Tractatus is to study the nature of language--its function and its structure.

Wittgenstein presupposed that the elementary function of language is to describe the world and that the structure of language is shown through logic. Thus, we have to resolve the following two problems, and then we may understand the nature of language: (1) what is the nature of logic? (2) how does language describe the world or what the relation is between language and the world?

The three main topics dealt with in Tractatus are logic, language, and the world for Wittgenstein would like to clarify the relation between logic, language, and the world. Wittgenstein thought that logic is the basis of philosophy; in Logical Investigation, he said:

And for early Wittgenstein, the purpose for studying logic and language is to understand the world. He said:

The truth-functional theory plays an important role in Wittgenstein’s language theory. He adopted the truth-functional theory to solve two basic and main questions, as shown in (1) and (2), in his language theory.

According to Wittgenstein, "the totality of propositions is language" (Wittgenstein, 1922. #4.001); we can then restate (1) and (2) as the questions shown in (3) and (4), respectively:

Wittgenstein thought that since we can use language to describe the world, there must exist some propositions that are related with the world directly. Therefore, whether the propositions are true or false does not depend on other propositions, but on the world. These proposition are called "the basic propositions" by Wittgenstein. The others are called "the compound propositions", which consist of "the basic propositions". Now, we can again restate questions in (3) and (4) as those shown in (5) and (6), respectively:

Wittgenstein believed that the answers to (5) and (6) lie in the consequence of a priori analysis method. He claimed:

He believed that there must be some requirements in language, and that language can be used to describe the world.

As discussed above, Wittgenstein believed that language is both possible and useful in depicting the world; however, he would like to understand how it is possible. That is, we can use propositions to describe the world, but how can propositions be used to achieve the purpose? Wittgenstein’s language theory, which consists of the Picture Theory and the Truth-functional Theory, is proposed to answer this question.

According to Wittgenstein, a priori logical analysis method is shown in the two concepts of "the basic propositions" and "the atomic facts".

A basic proposition is a proposition that cannot be analyzed further into any other simpler proposition (here, I do use the negative form). On the other hand, other ordinary propositions are compound; i.e., they can be further analyzed into other simpler and purer propositions. These simpler and purer propositions can then be analyzed into much simpler and purer ones. The analysis will continue until the propositions that cannot be analyzed any further are reached; i.e., when the "the basic propositions" are reached. Nevertheless, as shown by the quotation given below, Wittgenstein could not possibly analyze a proposition into the simplest form, and he could not possibly provide us with "the basic propositions"; instead, he a priori believed that there exist "the basic propositions".

In addition to the existence of "the basic propositions", he further claimed the features of them:

Early Wittgenstein used purely logical deduction to verify the existence of "the pure object". He criticized and expounded this idea of the atomic fact in Philosophical Investigations later. He said:

Therefore, the reality of the picture theory are generated from 5.1.1 the basic proposition and 5.1.2 the atomic fact. Through the consideration to the a priori language, Wittgenstein concluded that (we may say that it is ontology):

According to the discussions above, we can conclude that early Wittgenstein’s world view can be summarized as follows:

That "the world is all that is the case" (Wittgenstein, 1922. #1) and that "the world is the totality of facts, not of things" (Wittgenstein, 1922. #1.1) lend support to our conclusion above. In addition, early Wittgenstein’s language view can be summarized as follows::

Examining the summaries in (7-10) and in (11-14) indicates that according to Wittgenstein, language correspond with the world; that is, name, the basic proposition and the compound proposition correspond to object, the atomic fact, and fact respectively.

We have discussed the Picture Theory in section 1.2.3.1, the Truth-functional Theory, which will be examined here, is the other part of Wittgenstein’s language theory. He said:

However, what is the relation between the ordinary propositions and the basic propositions? Wittgenstein’s answer can be found in the followings:

Wittgenstein further invented a mechanic truth-value method. The truth value of a compound proposition is determined totally by the truth values of its components. Thus, if we have already known the truth values of its components, then we are able to calculate the truth value of a compound proposition. Accordingly, he claimed that all compound propositions are related with the basic propositions by the truth-functional method, and that if all basic propositions are given, then we are able to depict the whole world. A basic proposition is able to say" for it is a picture that reflects or corresponds with the reality; thus, all ordinary or compound propositions that can be analyzed into the basic propositions must also reflect or correspond with the reality. The truth-value method can then be summarized as follows:

The first two conditions, (15) and (16), determine what a proposition is, i.e., what is "say", and what is "has sense". If the truth-value of a proposition cannot be determined by the truth-false values of its components, the proposition is not a "real" proposition. By the word "real", it is intended to mean that it can reflect the world. Such a proposition is "senseless" and it does not say anything, instead of saying nothing. There are still other propositions that are not propositions because they are not the pictures that reflect the reality. These propositions are referred to as "false" propositions; they are "nonsense".

For example, "it is raining and it is cold" is a compound proposition; it consists of two propositions, i.e., of "it is raining" and of "it is cold". If "p" represents the proposition that "it is raining" and "q" that "it is cold", we can have the truth value table in (18):

This table shows that only if "p" and "q" are both true, then "pÙ q" is true. This compound proposition is a "real" proposition for it is either true or false, and its truth or falseness is determined by the truth values of its components. Thus, the conditions in (15) and (16) are satisfied.

The table in (19) is given to show the conditions in which a proposition is "senseless".

As shown by the table, no matter what the true value of "p" is, "pÚ -p" is always true, and "pÙ -p" is always false. That is, the true values of the compound propositions, i.e., "pÚ -p" and "pÙ -p", are not determined by the true values of their components. Thus, this kind of propositions is referred to as "senseless"; "pÚ -p" is called tautology, and "pÙ -p" is called contradiction (Wittgenstein, 1922. #4.46). Wittgenstein claimed:

Wittgenstein thought that all logical propositions belong to this group. Logic is not science, for it does not provide pictures to the reality. It does not "say" anything, but it can "show" what sayable and unsayable are--the limit of language.

As discussed above, in addition to the two kinds of propositions, i.e., the "real" proposition and the "senseless" propositions, there exist "nonsense" propositions. "Nonsense" propositions are those which can not be analyzed by the truth-functional method. According to Wittgenstein, esthetics, morality and metaphysics all belong to this group.

Wittgenstein’s language theory can be summarized and illustrated by the diagram below:

language

proposition

the basic proposition

name

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

object

the atomic fact

fact

the world

Language can only describe the world; it cannot describe the things beyond the world. Therefore, language consists of propositions, and all propositions can be analyzed into the basic propositions (all propositions belong to the truth-function of the basic propositions). The basic propositions consist of names. On the other hand, names are referring to objects. The basic propositions are the logical picture of the atomic facts. The objects are components of the atomic facts. The atomic facts are components of facts. The facts are components of the world.

The challenge to the existence of the basic proposition and the possibility of the basic analysis is to negate the aspects of the language to Wittgenstein. Early Wittgenstein believed that the function of language is to describe the fact. Accordingly, each term has its corresponding object, and each sentence has its exact meaning. That is, there exists the corresponding relationship between the combination of the language elements and the combination of reality.

In Philosophical Investigation, Wittgenstein seemed to understand for himself that the language theory he wants to establish in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the theory of corresponding meaning, a theory of specific picture of human language essence. The motif of the theory depicted in Tractatus this theory is that the term (name) is the meaning of that term. Later, Wittgenstein refutes his early idea upon which his language theory is based and which he called the aspect of Augustine language theory.

Wittgenstein argued against the main proposition of Augustine language theory, which claims that to master a language depends widely upon learning the names of the objects. The idea of Augustine language theory is accepted by the traditional philosophy, including the author of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, i.e., early Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein, later, criticized this idea by pointing out that Augustine couldn’t recognize the differences of the various terms. Wittgenstein further argued that if anyone considers language learning as an activity of naming, then he simply confines himself in the thinking in terms of concrete names, such as table, chair, bread (Wittgenstein, 1953. #1). If this is the case, the person won’t be able to realize the meanings of certain words such as "five", "fast" and "this". One of the examples given by Wittgenstein is as follows:

Given the example above, both "red" and "apple" have their meanings, but Wittgenstein would like us to think about the question what the meaning of "five" should be. In terms of the notion of usage of language, no such question should be raised; instead, we should ask "how the word ‘five’ is used". Thus, based on Wittgenstein’s "language game", it is appropriate to ask the usage of the word, "five", but it is absurd to question of the meaning of it.

According to the Augustinian aspect of language (Stock, 1996 cited Augustin), the approaches of explaining the meanings of words can be roughly divided into two categories. One is ostensive definition, which gives the meaning of words without using other words; the other is dictionary definition, which gives the meaning of words by using other known words. Dictionary definition is limited, and the meanings of all words will direct to ostensive definition because ostensive definition establishes directly the relationship between the true meaning and its corresponding word.

However, Wittgenstein pointed out that there exist some difficulties in this aspect of language. Some words that we use everyday cannot be defined by ostensive definition such as "number" and "this". The question "what does the word mean" is like the question "what is the time"; both questions will confuse us because we cannot point at something in the world to answer these questions. In addition, the phrase "the meaning of a word" leads us to believe the idea that there must be something or some object in the world which corresponds to the word. For example, everyone has his name and people call him by the name; that is, the name contains the meaning of the person.

In order to break the association between the object and the word, Wittgenstein suggested that "Don’t ask for the meaning, ask for the use". The advantage of asking for the use instead of the meaning is that we won’t get confused; then we won’t waste our time in searching for the true meanings that in fact cause confusion. The notion of usage doesn’t contain the hint of the correspondence between name and word. In addition, by merely understanding the "meaning" of a word, it is not necessarily true that we will be able to use the word correctly. On the other hand, by knowing the usage of a word, we know not only how to use a word but also the meaning of the word. Namely, to know how to use a word in a certain societal context correctly is to understand the "meaning" of the word in that context.

Wittgenstein gave an interesting analogy; he wanted us to compare the words in language with the tools in working.

The character (meaning) of a word depends on its usage, just as the character (meaning, if we prefer) of a tool depends on its usage. Wittgenstein’s analogy also reminds us of that words can be used in different contexts, just as tools can be used for different purposes. It is not appropriate to claim that all words serve the same function; likewise, we may use a screw-driver to knock a nail into a wood. Or, if we argue:

So, Wittgenstein asked:

Like words, a sentence can also be understood as a tool. When we are confused by a sentence, Wittgenstein gave us an advice:

Thus, we can conclude that both words and sentences are tools to attain certain purpose. To understand a sentence is to prepare its using; if we do not know how to use a sentence, then we can infer that we actually do not understand it. In particular situation, the usage of language is purposive; however, in the whole language, using language does not fix on a single purpose. Therefore, Wittgenstein gives us some examples:

Nevertheless, we should not oversimplify the conception of language. Language is not a tool; language is a set of tools to achieve various purposes. It is very obvious that this conception of language is a pragmatic perspective. Language is an operative machine that is doing its job in everyday lives.

The later Wittgenstein’s language investigation, even throughout his whole philosophy investigation, is based on that we cannot take it for grand to provide what the meaning is or that is something’s proof to what we are going to investigate. Philosophy cannot disturb the usage of our ordinary language under any situation. Our ordinary language is an open system which is a language with family resemblance.

What is a game? In general, the conception of "game" has certain connotation and intention. A game has the purpose of entertainment with contest; therefore, there must be someone who wins and someone who loses. A person will win a game depending on his skills and luck. In addition, there should also be rules that all the players must follow. And a game is held in a limited area and it is an activity with distinctive beginning and ending.

However, from Wittgenstein’s point of view, the common definition of "game" is too simple and it could not possibly explain the complicated nature of the notion of "game" in his language game. For Wittgenstein, not all "games" serve the purpose of entertainment, not all "games" possess the characteristics of contest, i.e., winning and losing, not all "games" depend on the players’ skills and luck, not all "games" will be limited in a specific area to play, and the most important, not all "games" are progressing in accordance with fixed and distinctive rules.

That is to say, Wittgenstein tries to argue that there does not exist the nature or essence in game. We do not have the common conception of "game". "To play game" is a kind of activity or activities with some certain resemblance. We can not simply give "game" a common definition to say what "game" really is.

4.2 Language Game

In order to understand what chess is, we have to understand the rules of playing chess games and the roles each piece plays in the games. Similarly, the "meaning" of a word is its position in the "language game"; the meaning of a word in a language should be determined by the grammatical rules. Wittgenstein further pointed out that "just as a move in chess doesn’t consist simply in moving a piece in such-and-such a way on the board–nor yet in one’s thoughts and feelings as one makes the move: but in the circumstances that we call playing a game of chess, solving a chess problem, and so on". (Wittgenstein, 1953. #33) Therefore, we may conclude, according to Wittgenstein, that language is a set of activities that are limited by some certain rules. Rules control the usage of the words in a language.

In order to understand the rules, we must understand the notion of "obeying the rules". If the social background disappear, then the rules hidden in this society will disappear, too. Wittgenstein said that "what sort of connection is there here? Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it" (Wittgenstein, 1953. #198), and that "but that is only to give a causal connection; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-post, a custom". (Wittgenstein, 1953. #198)

Based on the discussions above, we know that the common essence does not exist in "games" which are various. However, they are linked as various forms with relation, and then produce a "family. Just like all members in a big family exist various resemblance with different overlapping. Wittgenstein calls it "family resemblance". (Wittgenstein, 1953. #67)

Because there does not exist the common concept of "games", there does not exist the common feature to describe what the definition of "games’ is. Only family resemblance exists between "games". Therefore, the concept of "games" is not a defined concept, and its extension is not clear, too. And whether a activity is a game or not, we cannot make it sure beforehand.

Since there doesn’t exist the common characteristic in the activities that we call "games", that is "games" lack definitive characteristic, then we can not learn "games" or teach "games" be definition. But how? For Wittgenstein, only by observing, describing, and listing the concrete examples could we learn or teach the concept of "games" correctly. (Wittgenstein, 1953. #71)

Although the philosophical investigations was meant to be seen against the backcloth of the Tractatus, it is the whole tradition of which the Tractatus was the culmination that is being criticized. The criticisms are often indirect, confronting not doctrines and theses, but the presuppositions that inform them.

In his philosophy of language, Wittgenstein now rejected the assumption that the meaning of a word is the thing it stands for. The terms simple and complex, which are relative, were. That involves a misuse of the word meaning. There is no such thing as the name-relation, and it is confused to suppose that words are connected with reality by semantic links. That supposition rests on a misconception of ostensive definition. Not all words are or need to be sharply defined, analyzable by specification of necessary and sufficient conditions of application.

The demand for determinacy of sense was incoherent. Vagueness is not always a defect, and there is no absolute standard of exactness. The very ideal of analysis, inherited from the Cartesians and Empiricists, and developed afresh by Moore and Russell, was misconceived.

The terms simple and complex, which are relative, were misused. Many concepts, in particular philosophically crucial ones such as proposition, language, number, are united by family resemblance. rather than by common characteristic marks. The thought that all propositions share a common essence, a general prepositional form, was misguided. Not all propositions are descriptions, and , even among those that are, there are many different logical kinds of description. It was an error to suppose that the fundamental role of the proposition is to describe a state of affairs. It was a mistake to think that the meaning of a sentence is composed of the meanings of its constituents, and confused to think that truth consists in correspondence between proposition and fact. The institution of language can only be elucidated by attending to the use of words and sentences in the stream of like.

Wittgenstein’s philosophy has tremendous influences in the 20^th century. I would like to sum up with his influences in the following.

First, Wittgenstein’s early philosophy affects his teacher Russell’s philosophy, especially the Russell’s logical atomic theory. Russell thinks, like Wittgenstein, that there exists the exact correspondent relationship between language (propositions) and world (fact). The nature of our language has the structure of truth-functional value, the denotation theory; our language and world can be analyzed into their logical atom (for Wittgenstein, they are name and object; for Russell, they are logical proper noun, predicate term, and copula term as well as the sensible materials, the characteristic of the sensible materials and the relationship between sensible materials.) Besides, Russell accepts the idea that logical proposition is tautology from Wittgenstein.

Second, Wittgenstein’s early philosophy affects Vienna Circle. Vienna Circle claims that the clear and reliable knowledge, like logic and mathematics, is deductive. The reason is that it is analytic, not synthetic as Kant claims. We can attain the validity of analytic proposition through defining the conception of things, without considering their relationship, to know whether the proposition is true or false. However, there is no concrete content in the analytic proposition. What is the relationship between logical proposition and empirical proposition? Because of the edification of Wittgenstein, Tractatus, Vienna Circle make their claims clearer.

Third, Wittgenstein’s late philosophy influences the ordinary language school. Wittgenstein’s late philosophy emphasizes the expressive model of language on the practical usage, especially on the research of difference in different usage, and edifies the linguists of the ordinary language school. They do not agree that logical empiricism’s belief on using artificial language to describe the structure of the world. They claim that the ordinary language is perfect to express the various and abundant meanings in our daily lives. The theory of ordinary language should devote themselves on the research of the ordinary language and its rules, and make effective on the usage of the ordinary language and on the therapy function of philosophical explosion by analyzing conception.

Fourth, Wittgenstein’s late philosophy influences logical pragmatism in the US. Wittgenstein’s late philosophy emphasizes on the aspect of meaning in holism–the meaning is produced in the usage, especially in the context factor and pragmatic factor.

From the contribution of Wittgenstein’s philosophy which is mentioned above, Wittgenstein plays an important role to promote and complete the task of "language turn" in the philosophy. The "language turn" means that the central research on traditional philosophy turns from ontology to epistemology, and now to the language.

In history, philosophy in its initial stage concerns on the questions, such as "What is the original source of the world?", "Do universal concepts exist?". The reason is that human beings live in a colorful world, and they are curious about what is the original source. And things in the world are diverse and they are in the changing with creation and destruction. Things in the world are concrete. Does the universal concept exist? These questions are thought by the traditional philosophers for a long time, and they raised up a lot of explanation to solve these questions.

From the time of Descartes, philosophers realized gradually that if people would like to really understand what the world is, they should first understand the ability of understanding and limitation of human beings, in order to make sure that what they can realize and how they can realize. This is the first "philosophy turn"–"epistemology turn". In the process of studying the ability of understanding, philosophers began to study in the cognitive structure and the psychological structure.

Due to the study of the psychological structure begins at the case of individual, and induces the particulars to universals, this study lacks a sound inference. Therefore, philosophers turned to study the language, for the reason is that the language is intersubjective. They claim that there exists a certain kind of uniformity in the world, the language, and the thought. That is the uniformity of logical structure. However, some philosophers challenged this claim. This debate brought up the argument of the relationship among the world, the language, and the thought. And then it brought up the meaning of language expression and language understanding. By studying the philosophy of language deeply, some philosophers found that the problems which traditional philosophers held are related strongly with the language. Some of the problems are caused by misunderstanding of language. Therefore, some philosophers devoted themselves in studying the method of language function and the usage of language expression. By doing so, they hope to solve or dissolve the traditional philosophical problems. From then on, language questions became the center of philosophers’ concern, while the ontology and epistemology which were very popular before are put aside. This is the second "philosophical turn"–"language turn". Wittgenstein is the central figure to put the most effort for the turn.

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