An analogy between scientific progress and biological speciation has been introduced that will be of value in considering the vexed notion of scientific progress. (Ackerman, 1985, p. 71)
Even the most aimless changes will eventually lead to well-fitting forms, because of the tendency to equilibrium inherent in the organization of the process. All the agent need do is recognize failures when they occur, and to react to them. And this even the simplest man can do. For although only few men have sufficient integrative ability to invent form of any clarity, we are all able to criticize existing forms. It is especially important to understand that the agent in such a process needs no creative strength. He does not need to be able to improve the form, only to make some sort of change when he notices a failure. The changes may not always be for the better; but it is not necessary that they should be, since the operation of the process allows only the improvements to persist. (Alexander, 1964, p. 30)
It is commonly held that scientists do not generate hypotheses randomly, but rather with the goal in mind of solving some scientific problem. Now, if a purposively generated hypothesis has a greater chance of scientific success than a randomly generated one (a supposition we must fervently hope is true) the Condition 2 fails fully to be met. There are degrees here, of course. Perhaps "insightful" hypotheses are only slightly more likely than random ones to be successful, and only a tiny bit of the success of science is to be explained by the insights of scientists. Selection would in this case retain much of its force. But if "insightful" hypotheses are much more likely to be successful, selection is much eroded. (Amundson, 1989, p. 427)
[HOME] [NEXT]Adaptation by trial and error is sometimes treated in psychological writings as if it were merely one way of adaptation, and an inferior way at that. The argument given above shows that the method of trial and error holds a much more fundamental place in the methods of adaptation. The argument how, in fact, that when the organism has to adapt (to get its essential variables within physiological limits) by working through an environment that is of the nature of a Black Box, then the process of trial and error is necessary, for only such a process can elicit the required information. (Ashby, 1960, pp. 82-83)